An Evaluation of Riverside Drive short term collaborative project between Micah Projects Inc, Brisbane City Council and Queensland Government Department of Communities.

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Micah Projects Inc. is a not-for-profit organisation based in the local community of South Brisbane and providing services to the greater Brisbane Metropolitan Area. Micah Projects Inc is ISO accredited and is committed to the provision of quality, people-centred services. The organisational vision and mission are as follows:

**Vision**

To create justice and respond to injustice at the personal, social and structural levels in church, society, government, business and society.

**Mission**

To respond to people who experience exclusion, poverty, injustice and social isolation so that they may experience inclusion, economic wellbeing, justice and connection within their community of choice.

Micah Projects' core business is a commitment, focus and determination to advocate and deliver on its social justice mandate through key service areas:

- Homelessness Services: Lead agency for the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre; Street to Home – Outreach; Homelessness to Home - Family Homelessness; Home Front – Sustaining tenancies for people with disabilities; and the Reach Consortium – Early Intervention and Prevention Service;

- Young Mothers for Young Women: Peer Support, Education and Advocacy, Family Support and Early Childhood Program

- Esther Centre: A service for people who have experienced abuse in church and state care, faith communities or human services (Forgotten Australians);

- Mental Health and Disability Services: residents of boarding houses, privately owned supported accommodation facilities, affordable community housing and public housing providing personal care, community linking and tenancy support.

Micah Projects Inc is a member of Homelessness Australia, Queensland Council of Social Services, Australian Council of Social Services and Australian Common Ground Alliance.
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Purpose of the evaluation

This evaluation was undertaken to inform Micah Projects Inc’s reflections on its work practices with homeless people in the context of a hot spot. It is based on interviews with homeless people, Micah Projects’ Street to Home service staff and the Mater Community Clinical Nurse based at the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre. The evaluation was funded by Micah Projects.

Overview

The following information, mostly provided by Street to Home personnel, outlines what took place between April 2008 and July 2008 in relation to relocating 58 homeless people from Riverside Drive, South Brisbane.

To summarise, Micah Projects, through its Street to Home service, worked closely with most of these people who were advised that the Queensland Police Service would be exercising Move On powers and the site cleared by Brisbane City Council. Preparation for the intervention began before April 2008 and Street to Home is still working to house and support many of these people at the time of writing this report in August 2008. The scope of the evaluation however is for the period of 7 April 2008 when the lead worker commenced on site, to 25 July 2008.

$120,000 was provided by the Queensland Department of Communities for wages, operating costs and brokerage in two instalments to cover a six month period. $20,000 and three rental houses were made available by Brisbane City Council. These resources were to supplement the pre-existing Street to Home and Brisbane Homeless Service Centre’s capacity to mount a crisis response and attempt to find pathways for people into sustainable, medium to long term supported housing.

The Street to Home team engaged intensely at the site and then increasingly with individuals and household groups in a range of locations across Brisbane. Police also had a constant presence at Riverside Drive. The Mater Health Services Community Clinical Nurse worked closely with three individuals who had serious health problems and injuries.

The majority of people at Riverside Drive expressed anger, even rage about the situation. Dealing with this was very challenging for workers, especially the front line Assessment and Referral and Street to Home teams at the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre.

By the 25 July, after four months of focused effort, homeless people were not living at the Riverside Drive area and of the 58 people Street to Home had worked with:

- 26 people were in temporary accommodation (Pindari, Roma House, Oz Care, boarding houses and caravan parks)
- 15 people were in long term housing (8 in Brisbane City Council houses, 7 in Department of Housing and community managed properties)
- 14 people left without requesting or accepting assistance and were not in contact
- 3 people were still homeless and in regular contact with Street to Home.


The context

South Brisbane is an inner city suburb of Brisbane undergoing rapid growth and transforming from formerly industrial and warehousing land uses to medium and high density residential and office uses.

The physical focus of the Riverside intervention was a strip of land in South Brisbane between the Hale Street Link construction site, the back fences of the Parmalat factory and Hanson’s concrete plant and Riverside Drive looking over to the Auchenflower reach of the Brisbane River. The location, along with Kurilpa Park, has been used for many years by homeless people, sometimes in large numbers by Brisbane standards of up to 100 people.

Within walking distance there are services such as the Oz Care men’s hostel, the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre, Centrelink, Aboriginal and Islander Community Health Service, West End Community House and the Biala and peel Street drug and alcohol clinics, along with a supermarket, bus routes, hotels, and Musgrave Park, a significant gathering place for Aboriginal people. Volunteer-run food vans have included the Kurilpa Park - Riverside Drive area as a regular food and drink distribution point for many years.

Indigenous people have used the area for thousands of years. Traditionally the area was a rich resource location used by many groups. The southern bank was known as Kurilpa. The Kurilpa area was considered politically neutral and was accessed by northern and southern groups travelling to and from ceremonies. Kurilpa Point was a gathering and crossing point from a sandy beach and groups from Toowong and northern areas crossed here and at West End. West End and the inland area was a resource area with plentiful resources including water.1

Homeless people have used the area consistently in recent decades, partly because it was not used by the general population. In the 1980’s there was little or no public infrastructure on that part of the river bank, and no competition for its use.

That could not be more different today. Downstream there is public parkland, the new Gallery of Modern Art linking to a large cultural precinct of State facilities including the State Library, Queensland Art gallery, Queensland Museum, Queensland Performing Arts centre and then on to the South Bank Parklands.

Upstream is new luxury housing and low impact businesses/offices, a rowing centre and sports fields leased from the City Council which transform on Saturdays to commercial markets attracting thousands of shoppers and vehicles.

The area used by homeless people is also on an increasingly popular riverside bicycle, fun run and walking route, and many local and CBD workers use the area for free parking.

More recently, immediately downstream, a construction site has been created for the foot fall of a new Hale Street Link bridge and Tank Street Walk Bridge and although at the time of writing this report the State Government is yet to approve plans or tolling proposals, the Brisbane City Council has announced the project’s commencement.

Micah Projects is a Brisbane welfare organisation initiated in collaboration with St Mary’s Catholic Community, South Brisbane. Micah Projects’ mission is to respond to people who experience exclusion, poverty, injustice and social isolation so that they may experience inclusion, economic well being, justice and connection within their community of choice.

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1 Hale St Link Indigenous and Historical Heritage Assessment March 2006, Prepared for CHD by Bonhomme Crab & Associates
The services operated by Micah Projects are:

- **Homelessness Services:**
  - lead agency for the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre
  - Street to Home – outreach to homeless and intoxicated people
  - Homelessness to Home - family Homelessness
  - Home Front – sustaining tenancies for people with disabilities
  - Reach Consortium – early Intervention and prevention service

- **Young Mothers for Young Women:**
  - peer support, education and advocacy
  - family support and early childhood program

- **Esther Centre:**
  - people who have experienced abuse in church and state care, faith communities or human services

- **Mental Health and Disability Services:**
  - residents of boarding houses, privately owned supported accommodation facilities, affordable community housing and public housing providing personal care, community linking and tenancy support.

Street to Home's homelessness services are co-located in South Brisbane at the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre along with several other homeless organisations, namely, the Big Issue, Centacare - South West Brisbane Community Options Project and Mater Health Services Community Clinical Nurse. As a service hub, the shared goal is to make it easier for homeless people to find and use the services they need.
Street to Home’s Practice Principles

The practice principles, policies and strategies underpinning Street to Home’s work at Riverside were described by staff as:

- **respectful engagement**, acknowledging that homeless people have a choice about whether they want to speak or link with service workers.

- **a housing first approach**, meaning they tried in the first instance to assist homeless people find long term housing options rather than short term crisis or transitional housing. This included consistently talking to and working alongside long-term homeless people to voice fears and learn strategies to overcome fears or lack of confidence about living in a house and moving away from a familiar neighbourhood. Workers helped people trial using buses (off peak to avoid the scrutiny of suits and high school students), timed how long it took to walk to their usual inner city clinic, familiarise themselves with supermarkets and so on. One housed person confided how strange it felt to get into a habit of using light switches and that although he has a bed now, he still puts the mattress on the floor to sleep. Part of the housing first approach was to check that each person had a current application for public housing and renew it if not – a major task for those without identification documents.

- **targeting anchors**, meaning working first with the long term homeless people willing to engage with services as a way to decrease the attachments to a space and normalise moving off the streets.

- **planned support**, meaning housing is linked with support on mutually agreed tasks to help people sustain housing. This is something that continually evolves as problems are solved or new ones emerge. It is also responsive, flexible and often intensive.

- **integrating healthcare and social supports**, meaning the vital partnership work between the Mater Community Clinical Nurse, the Street to Home team and the Assessment and Referral team to assess needs, establish health care plans for individuals and ensure that they accessed the health services they needed. For example, the Mater Community Clinical Nurse described the importance of sitting with a person for up to five hours at a hospital emergency ward who needed medical treatment but because of previous trauma was highly fearful of institutional settings and institutional toilets in particular.

- **building on existing supports** that people had. For example some people at Riverside were camped in long-term friendship groups who cooperated to survive – took turns to stay at camp to mind the gear, shared money and food, shared camp tasks like cooking and liaising with the police. At least one group cared for a much-loved pet dog that was very protective of them. Street to Home assumed successful relationships like this are important to preserve in the same way they are an important part of life and interdependence for the rest of the community.

- **optimising occupancy** was seen as important because it became apparent that very few housing options would be available, so those provided were used for groups of people who already had relationships as described above.

- **use of brokerage funds** in a way that meant each person from Riverside could be financially assisted at least once for things that would help them move out of homelessness or stay housed.
• working collaboratively with other relevant services such as the Mater Community Clinical Nurse, South West Brisbane Community Options, all the community housing services managing the Brisbane City Council rental properties as well as the rest of the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre services

• well-equipped and supported staff, meaning the Street to Home Team Leader or Micah Projects Coordinator was available on call seven days/week until midnight to provide advice, information and hands on support as needed. Two of the Riverside Team were very experienced workers assisted by a trainee supervised by the lead worker

• flexible work hours, meaning paid overtime was available if needed for weekend and evening responses

• Action now approach, meaning that workers tried to be equipped to act promptly on decisions people made by carrying an outreach kit containing relevant application forms and other paperwork

• no banning, meaning that as part of Micah Projects' social justice philosophy, no client is refused a service

• client-worker reconciliation was used on occasions. The Riverside clearance triggered intense anger for some people and the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre Assessment and Referral staff were often on the receiving end. After one intense incident, rather than ban the person, a reconciliation process was held to help the people involved acknowledge their feelings, take responsibility for their actions and restore a reasonable client-worker relationship.
What happened at Riverside

The congregation of homeless people became a concern for Brisbane City Council. Some of the reported concerns were that routine footpath maintenance staff felt they couldn’t safely work in the area because of discarded syringes and other rubbish. At times, the people at the site also refused to let Council staff come near. There were public complaints about the site and the behaviour of people at the site. Public recreation and fundraising events which used Riverside Drive intensified community and political scrutiny of the camp. Staff and homeless or formerly homeless people interviewed for this report had a variety of views about why Council decided to invoke Move On powers at Riverside.

Street to Home were aware that the Queensland Police Service officers were also concerned about assaults occurring between users of the space and there were several ambulance and fire services call outs.

Brisbane City Council Public Space Liaison Officers spent time at Riverside Drive to advise people that the Council would be clearing the area in the future and that all camping gear and belongings remaining would be removed. Street to Home and Council have long shared a list of the people on site and their circumstances, so there was a good understanding of who was living there. (This information gathering was based on an assessment tool used previously by the Department of Housing for a coordinated effort to relocate people from Tent City in the same area in 2006. At that point Street to Home had advised the State Government that they were concerned about the potential for violence and other harms at the site but that they were under-equipped to attempt to provide services to people there. This triggered an intervention coordinated by the Department of Housing.)

The dates and descriptions below provide some information about the chronology of events from 7 April 2008 to the end of July, the period which is the subject of this evaluation.

7 April 2008
A Street to Home Riverside team was formed comprised of a newly recruited Support and Advocacy Outreach Worker, a two-day per week experienced Street to Home Support and Advocacy Outreach Worker and a full time trainee Support and Advocacy Outreach Worker. Their brief was to support the 58 homeless people at Riverside Drive to relocate, preferably into long term, sustainable tenancies by 30 June 2008, almost three months later.

Equipped with the Brisbane City Council-Street to Home list of the people on site, freedom to use the Street to Home’s resources, a flexible approach to the work, an assurance of support and back up from the Team Leader whenever it was needed, the lead worker began to immerse himself at Riverside, introducing himself, inviting people to talk to him about the support they might need to find housing.

The worker rapidly found that some people had heard such offers of assistance before but had very low expectations of a result. Combined with the knowledge that they were to be moved on by Council, some people were incensed and wasted no time letting the worker know.
8 April
Two Street to Home workers attended a Riverside Reference Group meeting of senior State Government and Brisbane City Council public servants to discuss progress and how resources to support the move would be coordinated. State Government agencies included Queensland Police Service from the local area, Department of Communities, Department of Housing and Queensland Health.

At this point, from Street to Home’s point of view, a lot rested on the expected supply of appropriate housing from Brisbane City Council. Brisbane City Council had instigated the Community Housing Partnership Program in 2005 which quarantined housing acquired by Council for future capital works and leased it in tenantable condition at no cost to community housing organisations who on-leased it at less than 75% of market rent.

While the rent levels put this stock out of the financial reach of people at Riverside Drive, Council had agreed to arrange for houses to be made available for a crisis response and to those who were *anchors* at Riverside. *Anchors* is a term used by the Common Ground supportive housing organisation in New York City to describe the homeless people they target - *those who have been homeless the longest, have the most disabling conditions, and are least likely to access housing resources.*

Micah indicated that there were twenty-eight such people, most of whom had serious addiction problems and other serious health issues. Micah had observed that when these people lived at Riverside Drive, others also drifted in to the site and illicit drugs misuse was a feature, as distinct from other groups at Kurilpa where drinking was a focus.

One Brisbane City Council house was available at this point in time, although having one when more were needed created its own problems.

8 April to 16 May
Over a six week period, the Street to Home workers were in a period they described as a maelstrom of contact with people as the level of trust with the Street to Home team grew and a crazy pace of follow up support work with people ensued. On some days 20 people from Riverside would present at the BHSC to contact or leave a message for the Street to Home workers to help follow through with various matters. The team and particularly the full-time Support and Advocacy Outreach worker worked extended hours, any day of the week if required to provide follow up support and advocacy.

Some people with complex health needs were referred to the Mater Community Clinical Nurse for assessment and inclusion in support plans for intensive follow up. Everyone’s public housing applications were followed up with many people finding their applications had lapsed years ago or were on hold because of missing information. As people disclosed their situations a wide range of support was offered, from securing overseas birth certificates to writing letters for Homeless Person’s Court Diversion Program hearings and brokering people into short-term accommodation.

The workers were scrupulously honest with people and often had to simply answer *I’ve got nothing for you* when repeatedly asked what housing options there were. For the most part, people appreciated the honesty and were happy for the Street to Home workers to continue visiting and also be contactable by phone or through messages left at the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre. At times, workers from other agencies inadvertently gave people misleading information creating false expectations, confusion, disappointment or anger. There were many occasions of extreme verbal abuse as frustrations boiled over.

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16 May
Street to Home discovered that Council had erected no camping signs on site. People were advised that the site would be cleared on 24 May. Council workers had mentioned to Street to Home from time to time that this would happen at some point but the Street to Home team was surprised that this had not been confirmed by Council in advance. They had been working with people on the understanding that the site would not be cleared until the end of June, and also that several Brisbane City Council houses would be available to the people at Riverside.

As an emergency response to this development and the anxiety and frustration expressed by people living there, Street to Home invited people to come to a barbecue at the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre the following day and to pull out all stops to find emergency accommodation. Overnight the Street to Home van distributed invitation fliers to people they came across at Riverside. Brisbane City Council provided $20,000 to pay for emergency accommodation, related needs and extra work hours from Micah’s services to have the site cleared that weekend.

17 May
At this point the site was partially cleared of rubbish, vegetation and uninhabited temporary structures. The remaining tents (about seven) were relocated to one smaller area and the people were advised that the area would be completely cleared on 24 May. Street to Home attended the site while this was happening and assisted people to move belongings.

Police advised the people at Riverside that there were to be no tents or structures on the site during daylight hours, though sleeping in swags that were rolled up and removed would be tolerated. Police woke the remaining people at dawn each day to instruct people to empty and pull down their tents. Some people persisted and re-erected tents and so this exercise could be repeated three or four times a day.

Twelve Street to Home and Micah Projects workers came to the Saturday barbecue to work with people to find and pay for temporary accommodation in crisis services, motels, boarding houses or caravan parks prior to the move-on day. Most of the remaining people from Riverside came to the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre that day, motivated by the urgency of the situation and the offer of assistance.

Some people were accommodated short-term in this way while others didn’t have the desire or resilience to cope with group living in boarding house style environments. One man moved his tent to a vacant block next to the local Centrelink office where he was prepared to wait until public housing or long term community housing became available. 14 people were referred or brokered and transported into motels and other accommodation on the day. For Micah, it was a positive experience of team solidarity and mutual support to meet the huge challenge.

A few more people from Riverside who had not been there on that Saturday turned up at Street to Home a few days later, realising the site was about to be cleared and still needing accommodation. They too were brokered into short-term accommodation locally or provided assistance with fares to return to supports in other communities.
21 May

A group of three people who had been long-term at Riverside moved into the first Brisbane City Council house, some six and half weeks into the intervention.

The Street to Home team reported several reasons for this delay. A key anchor group of people who were in stable friendships were offered this house. The three friends initially declined the option of taking the house on offer. When others in the wider group heard that housing was on offer to the three, there were some negative reactions towards them from others who also wanted housing. The three had an urge to stay with the wider group, as an expression of solidarity and for continuity of the relationships. At least one of them was also a long-term (homeless) resident of the area and felt a strong attachment to the neighbourhood and other locals, both housed and homeless. They also had previous experience of failed tenancies, particularly through the previous ‘Tent City Response’.

They were hesitant about moving from a familiar neighbourhood into an unknown one. They were unsure how they would access the services they depended on in the inner city and were not confident using public transport. They were uncertain about how to adopt a domestic lifestyle. They felt threatened about the idea of rubbing shoulders with people who they felt judged by, particularly young people and business people at shopping centres, on buses and the like. Previously, there was only talk of Council clearing the site, so delaying a move and putting off the degree of change involved was attractive.

Sensing that the group’s refusal to move was based on fears that could be resolved, the Street to Home team encouraged and supported them to have a go at dealing with these issues that characterise a dramatic transition from long-term homelessness to suburban living. For Street to Home, this was a labour intensive but eventually successful de-sensitisation process and series of transition activities – taking the three friends to visit the house periodically, being with them to have an occasional meal in the house, walking from the house to the inner city with the friends to see how long it took, helping them learn to catch buses at times when fewer students and business people were on board, providing an orientation to the local shops and amenities and purchasing things to equip the house in small stages rather than in an overwhelming way.

It also entailed providing transport and support to:

- sign and understand the terms of the lease
- secure a rental bond loan from the Department of Housing
- source furniture and household goods
- liaise with electricity and gas suppliers
- arrange Centrepay for payment of rent
- attend appointments for health services, e.g. Drug and Alcohol services, hospital outpatients.

Recognising the complexity of issues this household was dealing with, Micah also negotiated with Council over this period to advocate that the tenancy manager selected for this property be an organisation with a strong track record in dealing successfully with people leaving primary homelessness. This also took some time but Council accommodated this request, even though the organisation recommended by Micah was not already a Council preferred supplier.

A critical success factor at this time was the Mater Community Clinical Nurse’s engagement in casework providing vital support to address health care needs and help overcome fear and other barriers to accessing health services including drug and alcohol interventions. This collaboration uncovered significant health issues and the Mater Community Clinical Nurse and the Street to Home team then provided practical support to ensure progress and health outcomes. Links with mental health case management services were more difficult, as once people were housed, they were no longer eligible for services from the Queensland Government Homeless Health Outreach Team who only work with people while they are in public space.
22 May
A Reference Group meeting was held to report on progress. Micah had initially requested funding for 12 months to undertake the intervention and follow up. At this meeting, funding for a further three months was made available by the Department of Communities.

24 May
Brisbane City Council moved the last tents and cleared the land. Police were on site. Micah helped move the remaining people who had declined earlier opportunities to relocate. Some people were intensely angry at this point and continued to feel that way for a period of weeks. The Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre’s Assessment and Referral staff often bore the brunt of this, but the service has a no banning policy so processes of debriefing for staff were put in place. One person threatened to kill a Micah Project’s staff person and a reconciliation process was organised once the individual was out of crisis.

28 May
A second Brisbane City Council house became available and three people who had indicated they would like to share housing were supported to move in.

6 June
A third Brisbane City Council house became available and two people were supported to move in.

30 June
This was the initial deadline for site clearance given to Street to Home by Brisbane City Council.

14 to 31 July
Street to Home kept providing support and also undertook succession planning and handover introductions to prepare for the departure of the lead Riverside team worker whose time in Brisbane was only temporary.

Over time, the focus of intervention changed from relocating the large number of people from Riverside to intensive support for sustained tenancies and health care for 11 of those who were securely housed in the Brisbane area.
The evaluation

The evaluation of this part of the Riverside Drive intervention was commissioned in mid July 2008 with completion by the end of August. Street to Home did not have a large budget for the project so the expectation was for a brief exercise that would provide a picture and initial evaluation of what happened to support Micah Project’s efforts to reflect on their work and continue to improve their work practices. The purpose of the evaluation was to assist learning.

The evaluation framework

The evaluation is confined to Micah Project’s needs. Other stakeholders were not consulted about their objectives for the intervention or their views of what success would look like. The following framework was adopted.

Street to Home’s objectives for the intervention:
To provide pathways into medium-term and permanent housing and support in a three month period to people camped at Riverside Drive so that the site was no longer used as a camp or congregation point.

Desired outcomes:
1. Sustained tenancies with coordinated social, health and housing support for those moved from the site. This is indicated by success factors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 below.
2. Increased social inclusion - individuals feel more in control of their lives and feel more able to take an active, independent role in the community. This is indicated by success factor 6.

Success factors:
Success factors are vital elements or activities put in place to achieve the outcomes required. For this intervention, when we ask the question how will we get these outcomes, the answers reveal the most import strategies to put in place. The rationale for each intervention success factor is described below.

1. Engagement - Street to Home workers were able to establish communication and trust with the homeless individuals
   Rationale: To be able to work with people on solutions to their homelessness, it is essential to establish a respectful working relationship with them.

2. Receptivity to change - the homeless people who were most long term at Riverside and most connected to Street to Home were willing to move
   Rationale: Common Ground, New York, promotes the effectiveness of working first with anchors or the long term homeless people willing to engage with services as a way to decrease the attachments to a space and normalise moving off the streets.
3. **Housing supply – affordable and appropriate alternatives to Riverside Drive were available**

   Rationale: Moving people from one public space to another disrupts whatever meagre support systems they have been able to establish and is unjust and futile. Homeless people on Centrelink payments and/or with debts need and want a home to live in but have generally run out of ways to independently secure affordable housing.

4. **Supply of individualised support and healthcare – support and resources were available to suit individual need or circumstance**

   Rationale: Each homeless person is unique and has a unique set of needs, problems and abilities. Assisting them to have a home can reveal a wide range of barriers to accessing services and resources. Success is more likely if support and the way it is offered can be customised to the individual. In this situation, health problems were significant for several individuals, so providing healthcare support was crucial.

5. **Overall benefit - alternative living arrangements to Riverside Drive were considered advantageous by individuals who were the potential tenants**

   Rationale: To move from rough sleeping to housing, the homeless person needs to assess that, on balance, there are more social, financial and health benefits by moving into housing than remaining in public space. For some, their addiction issues also need to be taken into account.

6. **Control – while faced with the impending site closure, the intervention gave individuals a greater degree of control over their lives.**

   Rationale: Welfare service intervention should empower people to move towards independence, having more control over their life circumstances and social and economic participation.

**Measures and measurement method for each success factor**

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<tr>
<th>Success factor 1</th>
<th>Engagement – Street to Home (S2H) workers were able to establish communication and trust with the homeless individuals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>Method/Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Number of people who worked with S2H to establish an alternative living arrangement</td>
<td>T 1.1 Using the site census list, the S2H worker identifies those who did and did not engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 S2H worker perceptions of the number of individuals where the level of communication established was effective for problem solving</td>
<td>T 1.2 Using the site census list, the S2H worker identifies how effective communication was with each person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Homeless persons’ perceptions about how easily they could communicate with the S2H worker</td>
<td>T 1.3 Interview question for individuals from Riverside*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Homeless persons’ perceptions about the extent that they could trust the S2H worker</td>
<td>T 1.4 Interview question for individuals from riverside</td>
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* Interview questions are attached at appendix 1.
### Success factor 2
Receptivity to change - the homeless people who were most long term at Riverside and most connected to S2H were willing to move

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<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 S2H were able to identify and engage those who were most long term at Riverside and most connected to S2H</td>
<td>T 2.1 Interview question with S2H</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 S2H worker perception about the extent that views and actions of long-term, connected individuals influenced others</td>
<td>T2.2 Interview question with S2H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Homeless individuals’ perceptions about the extent that views and actions of long-term, connected individuals influenced others</td>
<td>T 2.3 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
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### Success factor 3
Housing supply – affordable and appropriate alternatives to Riverside Drive were available

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<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Percentage of people wanting affordable housing who received it</td>
<td>T 3.1 based on site census information, calculate numbers at the date of the Riverside 'clearout'; at the three month date; at the end July date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 S2H perception of how many people would be housed if supply was optimal</td>
<td>T 3.2 Estimation based on review of site census list</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3 Homeless individuals’ perceptions about whether housing alternatives were available to them, whether they were better or worse and why</td>
<td>T 3.3 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
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### Success factor 4
Supply of individualised support and healthcare – support and resources were available to suit individual need or circumstance

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<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.1 Percentage of individuals with planned support in place</td>
<td>T 4.1 Calculation based on site census list</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Individuals from Riverside believe S2H offered flexible support</td>
<td>T 4.2 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
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<td>4.3 S2H workers were able to negotiate for required support and resources across the service system to support sustained tenancies</td>
<td>T 4.3 Using a sample of individuals, review cases to identify whether identified needs were followed up and progressed fully/partially</td>
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Success factor 5
Overall benefit - alternative living arrangements to Riverside Drive were considered advantageous by individuals who were the potential tenants

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<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
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<tr>
<td>5.1 Individuals regard themselves as better off</td>
<td>T 5.1 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Success factor 6
Control – the intervention gave individuals a greater degree of control over their lives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 S2H worker perceptions of how many people, after three months, were better equipped to take more control of their life in terms of being homeless or not</td>
<td>T 6.1 Estimation based on review of site census list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Individuals from Riverside rate themselves as better able to be in control over whether they are homeless or not.</td>
<td>T 6.2 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Individuals from Riverside rate their experience of the intervention and the service system as positive</td>
<td>T 6.3 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Individuals from Riverside perceive that they have more knowledge and understanding of the service system post-intervention</td>
<td>T 6.4 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Individuals from Riverside can identify a goal in their lives</td>
<td>T 6.5 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6 Housed individuals from Riverside are optimistic about their ability to sustain the tenancy</td>
<td>T 6.6 Interview question with individuals from Riverside</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basic cost analysis
A limited examination of costs can be undertaken within the scope of the project. The overall public purse savings accrued when a person is no longer homeless is outside the project scope, although reference will be made to Micah Projects’ July 2008 service cost analysis in Journeys Through Homelessness – Whose Evidence? by Carolyn Mason, Partnering Works and Walter Robb, Analyse Australia.

It is important to note that only combined figures are available for the costs of both outreach to the public space users at Riverside Drive and the follow up case management for sustained tenancies. Ideally, in a future exercise the distinct service types could be separately costed.

The proposed aspects for analysis are:
- Total average cost of the exercise per medium-term/permanently housed individual
- Total average cost of the exercise per medium-term/permanently housed individual who was also supported with case management or planned support
- Total average cost of the exercise per individual moved from the site
- Total average cost of brokerage per medium-term/permanently housed individual
- Total average cost of brokerage per individual moved from the site.
Costs:
- Street to Home Riverside team hours
- Street to Home and Micah Projects’ management hours
- Street to Home and Micah Projects’ overheads
- Brokerage
- Other agency costs if readily available

Method:
- Scrutiny of all brokerage costs attributed to Riverside within the Micah financial system
- Riverside team work days calculated for both outreach/engagement and case management
- Estimations of Street to Home and Micah Projects’ management and administration contribution of hours
- Requests to other agencies to calculate the value of their services.
- Comparison of all costs with all income for the work from funders and donors

**Evaluation process**

Interviews were conducted with three Street to Home workers involved in Riverside, mainly focused on checking the relevant success factor measures against each of the 58 people on the Riverside ‘census list’. An interview was also held with the Mater Community Clinical Nurse about the costs of her close involvement with some people and her views about the intervention.

Interviews were requested by Street to Home and held with seven of the eight people housed and supported in the Brisbane City Council houses. The eighth person was invited to participate but declined to be interviewed. Interviews took place in their homes, one on one with the Street to Home worker out of hearing range. All interviewees were male. The Street to Home workers provided a simple meal as part of the process to express appreciation of the interviewees’ contribution to the evaluation.

Interviews were also held with seven people from the Riverside camp who were not in long-term or permanent housing. They were held at the Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre, one on one, with no staff in hearing range. The Street to Home worker explained the project to people who arrived at the Centre, asked if they were willing to take part, then contacted the consultant based in a near by office who quickly turned up to be introduced. Six of the seven interviewees were male. Street to Home acknowledged their contribution by providing each person with ten dollars.

People were given the list of questions and the interviewer read out the questions in a conversational style and recorded their answers, as well as any related comments they made. For example, the interviewer would say was it hard, okay, or easy to communicate with the Street to Home workers rather than a verbatim, how easy or hard was it to communicate with the Street to Home workers? Hard? Okay? Easy? The question sheet is attached at appendix one.
Evaluation findings

The summary of specific findings is outlined below.

Based on the evaluation success factors and measures selected, the outcome of sustained tenancies with coordinated social, health and housing support for those moved from the site was achieved to a large extent.

Success factor 1
Engagement strategies were largely successful
- the majority of people worked with Street to Home on alternative living arrangements
- effective communication was established with the majority from the workers’ perceptions
- the majority of homeless people thought communication with Street to Home workers was easy
- the majority of people thought they could trust Street to Home workers.

Success factor 2
Focusing on the receptivity to change of the long-term people at Riverside with strong connections to Street to Home (anchors) was partly successful:
- Street to Home were able to identify ‘anchors’
- Street to Home workers perceived that the majority of ‘anchors’ did influence others’ willingness to move
- homeless people raised other reasons as their motivation for planning to move.

Success factor 3
Supplying appropriate and affordable housing options as alternatives to Riverside Drive was largely unsuccessful:
- everybody wanted secure housing but the majority (95%) didn’t have it by the time the site was cleared
- half of the sample of homeless people thought their housing options were worse than Riverside Drive when the site was cleared.

Success factor 4
Supplying individualised support was partly successful:
- a minority of people had case plans or planned support in place, although the all those housed had case plans and healthcare plans
- the majority believed Street to Home offered flexible support
- negotiations for support/resources were successful if the service system had capacity to meet needs and criteria for eligibility matched the Riverside client groups’ needs. The major failure was the system’s lack of capacity to supply housing.

Success factor 5
The work successfully provided an overall benefit for those who were assisted into supported medium-term and permanent housing:
- All regarded themselves as better off.

Success factor 6
The outcome of increased social inclusion with individuals feeling more in control of their lives and more able to take an active, independent role in the community was partly achieved:
Strategies to give people more control were unsuccessful:
- Street to Home workers thought the majority of people were no better equipped to take control of their lives
• a minority of homeless people rated themselves as better able to be in control over whether they are homeless or not
• after the intervention a minority of homeless people had more confidence that the service system could help them
• a majority reported they knew more about available services after the intervention
• all interviewees had goals and hopes.

Costs
For the period of the evaluation, the Riverside intervention cost more than the funding provided by government.

Based on the four month evaluation period, and comparison with case management costs from the July 2008 Mason and Robb report (referred to on page 15) the Riverside intervention (which combines outreach and case management costs) appears to be an expensive way to achieve the desired outcomes of sustained tenancies with coordinated social, health and housing support. That said, the Mason and Robb report indicates that this kind of intervention is still less costly than the expense to the overall government and non-government service system incurred by long-term homelessness.

Differences for those who were housed and supported
Some of these findings are notably different if the focus is just on those who were accessed the medium-term or permanent Council housing and support. The areas of difference are:

Success factor 1 – housed people
**Engagement** strategies were even more successful
• *all* thought they could trust Street to Home workers.

Success factor 3 – housed people
Supplying appropriate and affordable **housing** options as alternatives to Riverside Drive was successful for this group:
• they all wanted secure housing, three of the seven had it by the time the site was cleared with a further five housed three months from the commencement of the intervention
• all those housed thought their housing options were better than Riverside Drive when the site was cleared. Once housed, the remaining five thought their housing option was better also.

Success factor 4 – housed people
Supplying individualised **support** was successful:
• *all* had case plans or planned support in place
• *all* believed Street to Home offered flexible support.

Success factor 5 – housed people
The work successfully provided an **overall benefit** for those who were assisted into supported medium-term and permanent housing:
• *all* regarded themselves as better off.
Success factor 6 – housed people

The outcome of increased social inclusion with individuals feeling more in control of their lives and more able to take an active, independent role in the community was partly achieved:

Strategies to give people more control were successful:

- Street to Home workers thought all the people housed were better equipped to take control of their lives
- a majority of those housed in Council houses rated themselves as better able to be in control over whether they are homeless or not
- after the intervention a minority of those housed and supported had more confidence that the service system could help them. This was the same for those not housed
- a majority of those housed reported they knew more about available services after the intervention
- all interviewees had goals and hopes. Goals of who were housed were largely about improved health and work while goals for those who were not housed centred on survival and housing
- all those housed were optimistic about sustaining their tenancies.

The results of each success factor are described in more detail below.

### Success factor 1

Engagement – Street to Home (S2H) workers were able to establish communication and trust with the homeless individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Number of people who worked with S2H to establish an alternative living arrangement</td>
<td>44 people (76%) did, 14 people (24%) did not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 S2H worker perceptions of the number of individuals where the level of communication established was effective for problem solving</td>
<td>41 people (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Homeless persons’ perceptions about how easily they could communicate with the S2H worker</td>
<td>Housed people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hard - 21 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okay - 1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easy - 4 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total perceptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hard – 2 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okay – 3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easy – 9 (64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Homeless persons’ perceptions about the extent that they could trust the S2H worker</td>
<td>Housed people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No - 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time - 0</td>
<td>Most of the time - 1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes - 72 (100%)</td>
<td>Yes - 6 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total perceptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No – 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time – 1 (7%)</td>
<td>Yes - 13 (93%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The question only relates to Street to Home worker perceptions - workers from other services may have established effective communication

4 One person where there was not effective communication established was housed in a Brisbane City Council house. There was effective communication established with the person’s companion, also housed.

5 Person explained ‘that is because I have a lot of trouble understanding and getting my point across’

6 Person said it was okay at first and then got easier

7 Two qualified this by saying that it depended on which worker. They didn’t trust all the workers.
To achieve the objectives of sustained tenancies and increased social inclusion, while respecting that individuals have a choice, it was proposed that a vital element or success factor is engagement. That is, effective communication and trust developed between workers and homeless people so that there would be willingness to work on ways to move away from the space.

*Micah workers are good. Did well. They are understaffed and need more workers.*

*Some are not reliable and are looking at their watch. Others don’t see it as just a nine to five job.*

(Interviews with people from Riverside)

The findings indicate that Street to Home was quite successful in engaging with people. While Street to Home doesn’t have a benchmark that it expects to achieve in terms of engagement, this data provides a baseline. Further, it is suggested that the results achieved are impressive when one considers the size of the group, the context of a move on when many people were extremely angry, and that there were no guaranteed housing options to offer in lieu of the long-established camp.

**Over 75% of the group worked with Street to Home to find solutions and there was effective communication with over 70% of people.** 85% of interviewed people from the Riverside Drive space said it was easy or okay to communicate with Street to Home workers and 93% said they could trust Street to Home workers. If people who didn’t engage, left the site and didn’t present at the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre had been accessible to interview, the ratings from people at Riverside may have been lower.
### Success factor 2

**Receptivity to change - the homeless people who were most long term at Riverside and most connected to S2H were willing to move**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 S2H were able to identify and engage those who were most long term at Riverside and most connected to S2H</td>
<td>S2H staff were able to identify 28 long term users of the space and were able to engage with 100% of those people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 S2H worker perception about the extent that views and actions of long-term, connected individuals influenced others</td>
<td>S2H perceived that seven long-term, connected individuals influenced others (as well as two shorter-term users of the space).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Homeless individuals’ perceptions about the extent that views and actions of long-term, connected individuals influenced others</td>
<td>None expressed that views and actions of long-term, connected individuals influenced others to move.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A critical element for success was proposed as working with long-term homeless people with connections to Street to Home (anchors) who were willing to move, in order to weaken the attachment to the space and normalise the option of moving off the streets.

*Three friends who were long-term homeless and long-term at Riverside Drive were well connected with all the people using the Riverside space and also had some authority there in terms of setting protocols or rules. For example, while I visited the site people knew and complied with the protocol that there would be no dealing and no fighting.*

*The fact they were preparing to move into housing, combined with definite move on action being flagged by Council and police meant it was easier to encourage others to move. It had a domino effect.*

(Mater Community Clinical Nurse)

The results showed that Street to Home workers were able to identify and then engage with all 28 of the people it assessed as anchors. Workers believed that seven of these people did have an influence on others’ readiness to move but none of those from Riverside interviewed expressed that the actions of other homeless people had an influence on them, neither when answering a direct question about this, nor in general interview conversation.

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8 The Mater Foundation Community Clinical Nurse had also observed that readiness of certain people to move from Riverside made it easier to assist others to think about moving.

9 If replicating this evaluation elsewhere, the question design for this measure should be re-examined
The main reason given by interviewees from Riverside for planning to move was the presence of Council and Police reinforcing that the whole site would be bull-dozed. It may be that a move on context clouds the evaluation of a success factor around the influence of engaging with the long-term, neediest people. The Riverside intervention therefore may not represent a proper trial of ideas about the influence of anchors. The results here are mixed, although the perceptions of workers from both Street to Home and Mater Community Clinical Nurse were that the decisions of anchors did have a positive influence on individuals’ receptivity towards moving.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success factor 3</th>
<th>Housing supply – affordable and appropriate alternatives to Riverside Drive were available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>Method/Tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3.1 Percentage of people wanting affordable housing who received it | 5% of those who wanted affordable housing had it when the site was cleared. (3 people).
|                  | 26% (15 people) had affordable housing by 25 July.                                           |
| 3.2 S2H perception of how many people would be housed if supply was optimal | 100% wanted to be housed                                                                    |
| 3.3 Homeless individuals’ perceptions about whether housing alternatives were available to them, whether they were better or worse and why | Alternative was a better option  
|                  | 3 people with long-term housing when Riverside was cleared.  
|                  | 1 with a hostel option  
|                  | 3 in a motel for a few days  
|                  | Alternative was a worse option  
|                  | 1 who saw rough sleeping as his only option  
|                  | 2 offered boarding houses  
|                  | 1 just said he had very few options  
|                  | 2 who had hostel options  
|                  | 1 in hospital (who ended up back sleeping rough)                                            |
|                  | Total 7 people or 50%  
|                  | Total 7 people or 50%  

Street to Home’s housing first approach is based on an understanding that the most effective pathway out of homelessness is to move into affordable, long-term, supported housing. It should be noted that Street to Home is not a housing provider, so has limited control over supply issues.

Heaps better here in the house. Boarding houses are like a time bomb waiting to go off - mental cases, drugs, straight. You gotta watch your back. People steal your clothes and if you take it up with people there’s a fight, but if you don’t they think you’re weak.

Some boarding houses were on offer, but sometimes in boarding houses you just dig a deeper hole for yourself – they are too hard. I wanted to save some money so didn’t want to be living in a boarding house. I’m black listed by Brisbane Boarders.

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10 4 who were offered long-term housing at a later date also said it was better than Riverside
One person who went to a motel said it was better than Riverside because it had comfort, a bed, hot water, some privacy, a lockable door and a place to make a cup of tea. ‘It was like heaven!’

Hostels were on offer – didn’t want to go to a hostel. They are a worse option. They think they own you.

I live like a millionaire. I like the area. There’s no crime. I’m not worried about something happening to the car. I am getting healthier. Eating better. I’m not better off financially, but will be eventually.

(Interviews with people from Riverside)

One man had a serious injury and was helped to move into a boarding house but he became very lonely. To be safe from standover merchants he had to stay in his room. There was a lot of drug dealing. He felt far safer in the homeless group – in public space where he knew people could be observed.

(Mater Community Clinical Nurse)

At the point when Riverside Drive was cleared, only 5% of people wanting affordable, secure housing had it even though 100% wanted it.

At the time the site was cleared, 50% of those interviewed for the evaluation saw their housing options as better than Riverside Drive, although most of those people (57%) still only had temporary alternative options in hostels and motels. The remaining 50% of interviewees felt the alternatives were worse than Riverside Drive.

100% of those interviewed who had affordable, long-term, supported housing at the time the site was cleared said it was a better option than being at Riverside. All four who moved into affordable, long-term, supported housing in the weeks after the site was cleared also saw it as a better option.

The remaining people with boarding house, hostel, rough sleeping, hospital and very few options all saw them as worse than Riverside Drive.

Nine weeks after Council cleared the site, by the end of the evaluation period, a further 21% of people had medium to long term affordable housing.

Given that the majority of the 58 people from Riverside had no medium or long term housing alternatives when the site was cleared and three people interviewed who said they had a better option than Riverside were only in a hostel or motel for a very short time, it is clear that the Riverside intervention largely failed to deliver on the housing supply strategy for success.
Success factor 4
Supply of individualised support and healthcare – support and resources were available to suit individual need or circumstance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Percentage of individuals with case plans in place</td>
<td>100% of people in Council houses had case plans and healthcare plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% of interviewees without secure affordable housing had case plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38% of all 58 people at Riverside had case plans at 25 July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49% of the 45 people who stayed on at Riverside and sought help had case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>plans at 25 July. (13 left without seeking assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Individuals from Riverside believe S2H offered flexible support</td>
<td>100% of interviewees\textsuperscript{11}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 S2H workers were able to negotiate for required support and resources across the service system to support sustained tenancies</td>
<td>This was partially successful depending on the service delivery systems capacity and criteria for providing services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each homeless person is unique and has a unique set of needs, problems and abilities. Assisting them to have a home can reveal a wide range of barriers to accessing services and resources. Success is more likely if planned support and the way it is offered can be customised to the individual. In this situation, health problems were significant for several individuals so including a healthcare practitioner in planned support was a critical for success.

They do 110% of the job.

We like it here. We’ve adjusted gradually. Back up support is the most important thing.
(Interviews with people from Riverside)

There have been gains in taking control but the men are still very vulnerable – it wouldn’t take a lot for them to slip back. They will need consistent support for probably 18 months and beyond. Even if there is no crisis, they need validation, to learn to believe that they are not worthless, that they should use support services when they need them.
(Mater Community Clinical Nurse)

When newly housed, making the transition mentally, socially, financially and physically is like assisting someone who has been institutionalised long-term. The whole experience of living in and managing a household has to be learnt. It’s the reverse of me suddenly adapting to being homeless.
(Street to Home worker interview)

\textsuperscript{11} 1 of the 14 interviewed said that some, not all of the S2H workers were flexible.
Success in the provision of individualised planned support yielded a strong result in that 100% of those interviewed perceived that Street to Home workers offer flexible support.

There was only moderate overall success in the provision of planned support — it was able to be offered to almost half of all those who stayed on at Riverside once the move on situation was known. The Street to Home lead worker reported that it was challenging to progress planned support in the absence of secure housing options to move to from Riverside Drive.

There was 100% success in the provision of planned support to those people who were able to take up tenancies in the Council-owned houses. Helping people sustain these tenancies was Street to Home’s highest priority in the Riverside intervention.

Workers reported no difficulty in the constant task of negotiating for support across the service system but some service system limitations had negative impacts:

- no funding for weekend nursing services
- Rapid Referrals to the Department of Housing yielded no housing
- referrals for affordable housing services in the evaluation period yielded no housing
- some mental health outreach services were unable to continue care for their client if he/she ceased to be homeless because of program eligibility criterion
- it was not possible to negotiate for Methadone to be dispensed in close proximity to the homes of some who were housed. This meant long, regular commutes for some.

The Mater Community Clinical Nurse felt that the Assessment and Referral team at the Brisbane Homeless Service Centre, Brisbane Boarders, HART 4000 and others were all able and willing to help. They were willing to pool ideas for innovative solutions, information about resources and funds available from various sources. The hospital to home transition was fully supported by Brisbane Homeless Service Centre services, a huge organising burden removed from hospital staff. This was confirmed by the lead Street to Home worker. The availability of brokerage funds was vital to supply goods and services where none were available through the service system.
Success factor 5
Overall benefit - alternative living arrangements to Riverside Drive were considered advantageous by individuals who were the potential tenants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Individuals regard themselves as better off</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not better off</td>
<td>Better off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43%(^\text{a})</td>
<td>50%(^\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(not housed)</td>
<td>(six housed, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not housed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(housed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Street to Home have found that to move from rough sleeping to housing, the homeless person needs to assess that, on balance, there are more social, financial and health benefits by moving into housing than remaining in public space. For some, their addiction issues also need to be taken into account.

I’m better off now, especially health-wise. I was going downhill. When you’re homeless you can’t move forward – you are stuck.

I don’t know – you can’t be successful when you are on a pension. To me success is a job, a stable environment, no debt. Living costs are high - $60 a fortnight for methadone and the rest for antidepressants, rent and food. We aim for one good meal per day.

(Interviews with housed people from Riverside)

The men no longer look homeless and they have started to feel like they have a right to be there (in a house). They are interested in everything going on around them and across the world – they can keep in touch via TV now and are reading with their new glasses.

(Mater Community Clinical Nurse)

Those in housing are very happy. They tend to have no complaints and some will never ask for help unless we encourage them to take up an offer of a service.

(Lead Street to Home worker)

I’m in a worse set up now. From Riverside I went to Pindari, Oz Care, jail, with a friend in public housing and now I’m on the streets again.

(Interview with person from Riverside who had no housing)

Based on the sample of 14 interviewees, the Riverside intervention had mixed success. Half (almost all those housed) saw themselves as better off while 43% of those who had secure housing saw themselves as no better off in their alternative living arrangements, and one had ended up back living at Riverside. If the interview sample reflects the views of others from Riverside, then the majority, who were not securely housed, would not see that they had benefited by moving from Riverside.

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\(^\text{a}\) One person was back at Riverside Drive. One person said they were still homeless so not better off. One person said they were homeless but had been more out of the weather at Riverside.

\(^\text{b}\) One person said they were still homeless but were less connected to a drug scene, so was better off.
**Success factor 6**
Control – the intervention gave individuals a greater degree of control over their lives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Method/Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 S2H worker perceptions of how many people, after three months, were better equipped to take more control of their life in terms of being homeless or not</td>
<td>26 people (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Individuals from Riverside rate themselves as better able to be in control over whether they are homeless or not.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 were still homeless (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Individuals from Riverside rate their experience of the intervention and the service system as positive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Includes all who were housed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 (57%) including 4 who were housed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Individuals from Riverside perceive that they have more knowledge and understanding of the service system post-intervention</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (36%) including two who were housed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5 Individuals from Riverside can identify a goal in their lives</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6 Housed individuals from Riverside are optimistic about their ability to sustain the tenancy</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Welfare service intervention should empower people to move towards independence, having more control over their life circumstances and social and economic participation.

In response to a question about whether the Riverside experience gave people more confidence in the service system:

> I have a little bit more confidence in the system. I have more confidence now about being able to get back into society.

> No – I’m waiting for the system to bite me back.

> Yes, briefly, but I realised I have to do a lot of things myself if they are going to happen. At first I had a lot of expectations about what Micah could do.

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14 One housed person said “I will be trying my hardest to make sure I don’t become homeless.”
In response to a question about whether people thought they would become homeless again:

That's a hard one. One day this house won't be here.

Would really like a time frame about how long we can keep this tenancy so you can set goals and plan.

Yes. So long as I can stay on Centrelink and stay in this house. This is my last chance at real life. It's almost too good. I'll fight to keep this place.

The results of this success factor are markedly more optimistic for those who were housed in terms of having more control over their lives and remaining housed.

Workers and interviewees both saw people or themselves as no better equipped to take more control over their lives and their state of homelessness in the majority of cases. This is not a surprising result given that people had no control at all over whether they could remain at Riverside, the long-term home for some of them. The implementation of Move On powers meant control over that space was removed from them.

All those housed and supported felt they would be able to sustain their tenancy. One interviewee said he would be shattered if they lost the house. Most said they would like to know well in advance if the Council needed the properties back. Lack of information about what would happen to the Council-owned housing was seen as a key issue people could not control.

All those interviewed had a goal or plan for their lives. While people were not asked to disclose their goals, most volunteered the information. For those housed, goals included work (four people), contact/relationships with children, improved health (two), recovery from drug addiction, stay alive for another ten years (in order to be able to look after the dog), happiness, to not slip back into homelessness, to get as much out of life as possible and to go to the groups and activities at Micah (I like hearing what the young kids say in the discussion groups).

The goals of those not housed were more likely to be about survival - to be housed or settled (seven people), to know a partner is safe/cared for, have identification papers in a safe place, work (three people), get a driver's licence and own a pet.

Half of the interviewees said the Riverside intervention was positive overall but only a minority had more confidence in the welfare service system, perhaps in part because most people also saw the whole move on exercise as a bad thing.

Most of those interviewed said they learnt more about welfare services through the process.

Several stressed more than once that help and support was what made it possible to sustain the tenancy and learn how to handle the new situation of being housed, dealing with the health system and so on.
Cost analysis

For the purposes of this exercise, the following included costs and estimates for both outreach to public space and case management for sustained tenancies and health support were used:

- $61,044 - Street to Home Riverside team hours (2.4 fulltime equivalent staff in the Riverside team, an average of 5 hours/week overtime by the key Riverside worker, operational overheads)
- $20,649 - in kind contribution from Street to Home and Micah Projects core services and management support (Street to Home outreach van two-person team for an average of one day/week, Street to Home Team Leader time of two days per week, Micah Projects Housing and Liaison officer for an average .5 days per week, Micah Projects Coordinator for an average of .5 day per week, brokerage administration)
- $40,456 - brokerage for the four months to end July plus an estimated $5,000 worth of donated goods distributed
- $3,500 - other agency costs if readily available (for Mater Community Clinical Nurse. This cost excluded the time spent meeting and people from Riverside and costs of dressings and basic treatment materials used).

The total estimated costs are $120,649.

Cost comparison –
*Journeys Through Homeless – Whose Evidence?*

A report commissioned by Micah Projects in 2008 has been used as an approximate point of comparison of costs. That report calculated pervasive case management provided by the community sector (defined as seven daily visits per week) at $25,000 per annum or $8,333 for a four-month period per person. This point of local costs comparison has been used without factoring in any unique cost differences generated in the move on scenario at Riverside, which entailed time for both case management and outreach to/engagement with public space users. The report also costed the overall service system costs to support a long-term homeless person at $40,000 per annum or $13,333 for a four month period. Comparisons with the Riverside Drive intervention costs are detailed overleaf.

For the period of the evaluation, the Riverside intervention cost more than was provided by funders.

Based on the four month evaluation period, the Riverside intervention appears to be an expensive way to achieve the desired outcomes of sustained tenancies with coordinated social, health and housing support. (Note that Riverside Drive outreach costs are blended in with case management and brokerage costs.)

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Using the Micah Projects expense figures above, the following amounts were expended:

- $8,043 - total average cost of the exercise for each medium-term/permanently housed individual (all costs divided by the 15 housed)
- $10,968 - total average cost of the exercise for each medium-term/permanently housed person also supported with case management or planned support (11 people). This is $2,635/person/four month period more than the comparative pervasive case management costs of $8,333/per person/four month period. However, the $10,968 per housed and supported person was $2,365 less than the expense to the government and non-government service system of sustaining a rough sleeper.
- $2,080 - total average cost of the exercise per individual moved from the site (all costs divided by the 58 on site)
- $2,697 - total average cost of brokerage for each medium-term/permanently housed individual (all brokerage and donations divided by the 15 who were housed)
- $697 - total average cost of brokerage per individual who moved from the site (all brokerage and donations divided by the 58 on site).

The State Government funding of $80,000 for a four month period and the Brisbane City Council’s contribution of $20,000 to bring forward the date the site was to be cleared amounted to 83% of the costs of the intervention.

The total average cost for each of the 58 people moved from Riverside was 25% of the estimated standard community sector costs for pervasive intervention.

The total average cost for the outcome for each of the 15 housed individuals was 97% of the estimated standard community sector costs for pervasive intervention.

The average per person cost for a result of 11 housed people who also received planned support were 132% of the estimated standard community sector costs for pervasive intervention.

Street to Home workers described 13 of the 15 people who moved from Riverside into medium or long-term housing as long-term homeless people who had been homeless for 12 months or more. If these people remain housed for 12 months, then the estimated savings to the service system would amount to $520,000. (Based on the costings in the 2008 Mason and Robb report cited above).
Advice to government

At the end of each of the fourteen interviews with people from Riverside, people were asked if they had any advice for Street to Home, the Council or the government about situations like Riverside.

Advice from those who were housed is summarised below and applies to issues of resources, well-informed policy and program development, integrated rather than siloed responses, policy and program gaps and priorities, service delivery and urban planning:

- Employ more social workers.
- Provide access for homeless people to amenities like toilets and showers.
- Provide somewhere for the homeless to camp while saving up to move into housing – at least allow people three months to save up and work out how to move.
- Different parts of government should talk to each and work together.
- Government should be informed so that they can understand what it’s like for homeless people – that it is impossible to save up, that some use drugs to cope with homelessness, that people have to spend their money on takeaway food because they have no kitchen, there is no way to secure belongings, so things go missing.
- Government needs to understand that after ten years of homelessness, people can’t easily break the homelessness lifestyle.
- Government should look at how to prevent people released from prison being homeless – when released, people have virtually no savings from their employment while jailed, have just a double Centrelink payment to survive on but have no where to live. Most people in jail are from dysfunctional families and have little education so they face many barriers to improving their lives.
- Government needs some better ideas on how to house people – we can’t get into the rental market, people are on tenancy black lists, people leaving jail can barely survive, there are issues of drug abuse and the systems are just not working to deal with these situations.
- Focus of efforts should be on doing something to ensure the young people don’t lose the plot and become homeless.
- Don’t clear out places like Riverside unless there is a plan to ensure something good eventuates for the people using the space – don’t just move people on or ‘they get stuck in limbo’.
- Services and government need to understand that the ongoing support is the most important aspect. Without support people would be back on the streets.
- For some homeless people, because of their backgrounds and the amount of time they might have spent in institutions, they have not learnt how to deal with many of things that are part of normal life. People might only know how to be homeless and deal with that sort of life.
- Government and Council should protect and preserve the beautiful old buildings at Riverside near the Hale St bridge construction area, such as the Paul’s maintenance shed. Government should turn it in to an arts and activity centre for young people and for the community.

The ongoing support is the most important. It’s make or break. I’d be on the streets again by now if I didn’t have help. I don’t know how to handle a lot of things. I was in institutions and then in jail in my 20’s and so I didn’t learn about a lot of normal things. We were at Riverside for 11 years – that’s what I know how to do. (Interview with person from Riverside Drive)
Advice from those who were not housed securely applies to issues of resources (particularly housing supply and support), Oz Care service delivery changes, poverty/homelessness traps, move on powers impacts, impacts of policing on homeless public space users and recreation.

- The Department of Housing should make more housing including units available.
- Housing for couples needs to be a priority because there is so little available that’s affordable. In West End a couple can be charged $180/week for a poor standard room with a just a single bed.
- Government and services need to understand that a couple who has spent many years together are naturally dependent on each other. Services shouldn’t try to split couples up or label them as co-dependent.
- Provide affordable housing to anyone on Centrelink benefits because nothing else is affordable.
- Increase funding and support options - it seems the only way to get housing is through Micah who also give support.
- Prioritise help for street people because a lot of people are facing very hard times.
- Help people work out how to improve their situation, especially those who can’t read or write.
- From 1 September Oz Care will no longer allow rough sleepers to have meals, showers or do washing and the rent for those staying there will go up. The impacts of this change will be more pressure on street people leading to increased conflict and survival crime, reduced safety. For example, if people can do washing they will keep needing new clothes and will have steal them in order to spend money on food. It will lead to more arrests and more jail. The laundrette at Pindari is available but that means a lot of walking back and forth carrying bundles. Oz Care should deal with the few people who cause trouble but leave the current services as they have been.
- Government needs to understand how people become trapped – for example, a bond loan would be useful, but if a person works and earns a certain amount then they are ineligible for it. On the other hand, to save up a bond, a person would need to stay homeless for a month but to save there is very little money to spend on food or washing. Without regular food and clean clothes people can’t get employed.
- Street to Home, Council and the Government are all just doing their jobs at Riverside. ‘Everyone’s been good to me’.
- Moving people on from public space is just a band aid solution because homeless people will still be near by.
- Government should move people on from public space because the public sees homeless people there and because it looks bad, they looks down on homeless people, so it’s bad for everyone.
- Because West End real estate prices are soaring, Council doesn’t want homeless people in the area, however, homeless people will continue to be in the area to access food. A homeless person without a refrigerator or stove who can’t access Oz Care meals or food vans at Riverside will focus on where food is available.
- Police should stop harassing the street people who have no where else to go.
- Government should focus on solutions – people on the housing wait list will be moved on by police again and again, and end up in jail which at least guarantees a bed and a meal

And a final word of advice, delivered with a grin, *How about a day trip to the Gold Coast!*  
(Interview with person from Riverside)
Discussion of findings

Street to Home set out to provide pathways into medium-term and permanent housing and support in a three month period to people camped at Riverside Drive so that the site was no longer used as a camp or congregation point. Did they succeed?

Street to Home's strategies had success or partial success in engaging people, working with ‘anchors’, providing flexible support, and creating overall benefit for those housed.

Strategies to link people to medium-term or permanent housing, allow them to have more control over their lives and confidence in the service system were unsuccessful.

For those who were supported and housed in the houses Council made available, most strategies were successful. Exceptions were that the people involved didn’t express that the actions of anchors influenced them to relocate and they didn’t have increased confidence in the service system. The move on context for the intervention may have influenced the latter findings.

The site was cleared and the actions of Brisbane City Council and Police could be seen to be responsible for this, though not for the support, housing and accommodation elements involved. Brisbane City Council played an important role in making three houses available for use. Only five offers of public housing were made during the evaluation period for people whose applications had been lodged for some time. Other housing and accommodation services were largely unable to offer any medium or long-term vacancies during the period of the evaluation.

Additional observations

In interviews with workers and homeless people, some additional strategies or factors emerged as important:

- It was beneficial that workers had previous experience in understanding alcohol and other drug addiction issues. This view was expressed by homeless people as well as workers.

- The lead Street to Home worker felt that significant experience in the homelessness sector and good interpersonal skills were critical for his safety at times when the camp at Riverside was volatile. Those skills were also essential to build cooperative relationships at Riverside.

- Several homeless people said they valued workers who were reliable (did what they said they would do) and punctual (turned up when they said they would).

- It was critical that the tenancy managers of Council’s three houses had skills and experience of working effectively with long-term homeless people.

- Initial rent arrears for those who moved into Council housing were not treated as grounds for breach of the tenancy agreement. As the complexity of the lives of homeless people began to be addressed in their new environments (identification papers, bank accounts, Centrepay arrangements, utilities connections, bond loans and so on) things sometimes went wrong, and not necessarily because of errors on the part of the tenants. Some leniency to sort out problems was necessary.
• Although Street to Home had contracted to take on a very complex piece of work to support the clearance of 58 people from the site, they did it without knowing at what points in time Council’s houses would become available and all approaches to the suppliers of publicly funded community housing failed in terms of yielding tenancy options within the four month period evaluated. There was a lot of time when support and activity was maintained but could not be focused on concrete alternatives to Riverside.

• While the State Government, Brisbane City Council and Micah Projects collaborated for the Riverside intervention, Street to Home was not given prior warning by Council about critical actions, particularly that the site would be cleared at an earlier date than initially indicated. This meant Street to Home had to work intensely around the weekend of 17 May to avert a crisis. Council provided $20,000 extra to allow for fast-tracking into accommodation that Street to Home knew was only a short-term arrangement.

• Conversations with long-term homeless people from Riverside revealed how attached they are to the West End area, something that is also commonly expressed by home owners and tenants in that community. Relocating to a different neighbourhood and breaking that sense of belonging in West End was very hard for some, not something usually acknowledged by decision makers in government. The positive side of moving away was expressed by some as the opportunity to break out of a more drug focused network and trouble.

• One of the strengths identified and supported by Street to Home was the presence of strong supportive and caring relationships between some of the people at Riverside Drive. By housing some of these friendship groups or companions together in the Brisbane City Council houses, Street to Home increased the likelihood of sustained tenancies. Of course, no share house is guaranteed of long-term harmony but the mutual support between tenants was quite evident as people were interviewed. The three of us look after each other. Two’s company and three’s a crowd, but not in this case. It seems unlikely that the successful matching up of supportive friends and companions for shared housing could be achieved by a more remote and formal process such as Queensland’s One Social Housing System.

• In discussion with some individuals housed in an outer suburban area with low frequency public transport, it was apparent that the need for meaningful use of time or work was emerging. A strong focus on transition to work and volunteering seemed necessary.
Evaluator’s comments

Given the evaluation findings and other information from informants about this four month period, the consultants conclude that:

1. The Riverside Drive intervention demonstrates that the level of Brisbane’s homelessness can be reduced significantly if there are services with skilled workforces and enough resources to provide the combination of medium or long-term housing and planned welfare and health support.

2. Of the 58 people at Riverside, including an estimated 27 who had been homeless for 12 months or more, none preferred to sleep rough and all wanted to live in secure housing. Those who were initially reluctant to take up a housing offer all did so once specific fears and concerns were dealt with in practical ways.

3. Street to Home demonstrated that with support, long-term homeless people who are also ill and have serious addictions can successfully make the transition from rough sleeping to medium-term housing, with immediate health and social benefits for those individuals.

4. Without consistent and intense support, sustaining the tenancies of the people from Riverside would be highly unlikely. Given the situations of those who were provided with medium-term housing and planned support, it cannot be expected that their need for support will end after six months, two years or any predictable cut off point.

5. Without sustained and intense support, many homeless people would be unlikely to successfully access treatment, especially from hospitals.

6. If homeless people congregating in public space are moved on without prior arrangements for alternative housing supply, there is little likelihood that they will experience and overall benefit.

7. Ideally, intervention in public space should occur promptly and constantly to prevent the need to use move on powers in relation to large, visible groups of homeless people. This is because:
   - homeless people feel intensely persecuted and excluded when they are the focus of constant police attention, leading to intense anger and hopelessness
   - it is unjust to use the laws of the state to prevent people from living in a public space while they are simultaneously excluded from private housing due to lack of funds and excluded from social housing due to lack of housing supply. In this situation we demonstrate our society’s intolerance of homelessness at the same time as we show tolerance for an absence of solutions to homelessness. This is in spite of our adoption as a nation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to housing, medical care and necessary social services
   - while Street to Home agreed to provide services to those at Riverside, the situation created anger and conflict, much of which had to be borne by Street to Home and Brisbane Homelessness Service Centre-based workers. This is a hidden, personal cost of move on decisions paid by homelessness services. It could be described as pain shifting – the ‘pain’ experienced by elected officials (whose constituents are concerned or unhappy about visible homeless) is shifted to non-profit homelessness services, funded to deliver additional services, as well as to homeless people themselves.
the social housing and homelessness service systems seem unable to respond to peaks in demand that are generated by requiring large groups to move on. Clearing Riverside equated a demand for housing and support for 58 people. Adequate housing was not available and if it had been, Street to Home would probably not have been able to sustain planned support for that number.

while the Council's announcement of the impending clearance of the Riverside site created a sense of urgency to find alternatives, the inability to find alternatives meant a proportion of the support service hours were wasted, unproductive hours (in terms of not being focused on a transition into housing). This was an added expense in the response at Riverside, borne out to some extent by the average higher costs per person than the estimated standard community sector costs for provision of pervasive support/case management.

A cost-benefit analysis was not possible within the scope of this evaluation, but based on comments and observations from people from Riverside and service workers, the personal benefits for those who were able to move out of homelessness were immense in terms of quality of life, health, management of addictions and a sense of deserving to belong in the community. I've observed the men have adapted very positively to their changed circumstances. For example, while not being comfortable initially in supermarkets and knowing other people were not used to seeing them (especially at first when they still looked like homeless people), rather than feel defensive or hostile, the men have decided to be very helpful to others, getting things down off high shelves, smiling at people and being friendly. (Mater Community Clinical Nurse)

Some of the individuals from Riverside are housed in Brisbane City Council owned properties that are earmarked for potential demolition or removal for future road works or similar uses. The tenants are aware of the situation but never-the-less, some have pinned all hope on being able to stay housed and make improvements to their health, relationships and prospects. Micah Projects should seek a formal agreement from Council that a very generous period of notice be given prior to these properties becoming unavailable for tenanting. Given the significant investment of resources in assisting these tenants to remain housed, it would be tragic if the hard work done were jeopardised or these people became homeless again due to an unsatisfactory transition to a new house or neighbourhood, or indeed if no alternative secure housing were available.

The supply of appropriate affordable housing was an obvious gap in the intervention. Brisbane City Council provided housing for three households or eight people, even though they are not a housing provider. The Department of Housing and community housing agencies responded with even less housing, even though providing housing is their job and they are supposed to be implementing a needs-based allocation process that would give people from Riverside high priority.

If Micah Projects were asked to undertake a similar intervention in the future, they should do so on the condition that:

- the project would only begin once an agreed amount of suitable housing or accommodation from a range of providers was identified for use for the people being moved on

- a communication protocol was agreed and formally signed to clarify expectations about communication by all parties. As a minimum, Micah Projects should require minimum advance notice of any key dates or actions by Brisbane City Council and State Government agencies impacting on the location of concern

- if there was an intention to provide planned support or case management, that agreement be reached about how the anticipated long-term support needs would be sustained.
12. The positive side of the move on was that people knew in advance that it was happening, eventually knew exactly when and how it was happening and most people were eventually resigned to the idea that they had to make a change.

13. The Riverside Drive move on was possibly seen by local and state governments as an intervention at a point in time. However, from a local area perspective, the cumulative impacts of local changes can be seen. For example, the number of uncontroverted public spaces where homeless people can gather has shrunk in recent years, the Hope Street Indigenous drop-in service was closed down and not replaced, no private rental options exist for this population in the area other than some boarding houses which can bring their own intense problems of close communal living, greater police attention on homeless people, the reduction of services flagged from 1 September 2008 by Oz Care. All combine to make many homeless people feel unwelcome, a mix of anger and hopelessness, discriminated against and less networked to friends and services. This is potentially a volatile mix and the antithesis of social inclusion.

14. The work to help people accumulate the documentary evidence to register their housing need with the One Social Housing System was probably a good investment of time if it yields future access to the social housing system. It appears that continued vigilance will be required if people with no fixed address are to receive notice of housing vacancies.

15. Availability of appropriate housing and support together is crucial to a successful intervention. Those who were housed were overwhelmingly more positive about the experience than those who weren’t.

16. The evaluation identifies some key features of appropriate housing:

- It needs to be secure – the people need to be able to stay in the same place for a reasonable period (possibly two to three years given the fact that it is so difficult to achieve a shift).
- It needs to be perceived as safe by the tenants – when people saw a situation (e.g. a boarding house) as dangerous, they preferred to be rough sleeping in a group.
- Some people need to be able to live with or near a peer group they feel comfortable with, such as the people they have already been homeless with – share housing is a good option for this group of people as it closely matches their living arrangements as homeless people.
- For this group of people (contrary to the general community view) sleeping rough is not the worst possible housing option – a number of options such as some boarding houses or homelessness hostels are seen as worse than sleeping rough, so there is no point in offering rough sleepers this kind of option. A key point that homeless people’s responses highlight is that none of them choose to be homeless – they all want housing but they don’t want substandard housing.

17. The process of accessing housing needs to be tailored and supportive - an impersonal system like the One Social Housing System general allocation process is unlikely to provide matching for success as these tenants have very particular needs, and their entry to housing needs to be managed very carefully.

18. Intense flexible support to housed people made all the difference, a statement repeated by those receiving support as well as workers. A form of cultural competence on the part of workers seems to be an essential, but often assumed, set of skills to ensure they understand how long-term homeless people see things. Powerful personal transformations are possible as long-term homeless people become included in communities.
Conclusion

The evidence demonstrates that it would be unwise to repeat the use of Move On Powers in situations of this scale and also unwise to undertake the welfare service delivery side of the equation. Rather, constant and intense planned support provided to rough sleepers using the housing first approach is likely to deliver greater benefits. It is also more likely to prevent the build up of large congregations of rough sleepers in public space and the need for costly relocation interventions.

The theory seems good but the weakness is that the overall service system seems unable to supply either the amount of housing or the support needed and so visible congregations of homeless people inevitably increase.

When police repeatedly moved one homeless interviewee on, he protested that, we have to be somewhere. For Micah Projects, whose impetus for service has grown from the social justice vision of St Mary's Catholic parish in South Brisbane, if authorities are proposing use of Move On Powers, perhaps the most compassionate response is to stand by people and help them cope with the onslaught, all the while knowing that only a minority will be able to truly benefit long-term from their efforts to assist.

The evaluation results provide a strong challenge to any future intervention of this nature. The homeless people moved on from Riverside Drive were not homeless by choice. Every one of them wanted decent, secure housing but most were not housed by the end of the project because appropriate housing was simply not available.

Any future interventions will need to ensure they can replicate the successful engagement and support strategies used for this project, and ensure that planned support continues to be available over an extended period to people who have been homeless long-term. They will also need to ensure there is a firm tie-in to long-term, quality housing which provides people with a genuine alternative to sleeping rough.
Appendix 1
Interview questions for people from Riverside Drive

Anything identifying, like names or addresses, will be kept confidential unless the person wants to be identified

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>How easy or hard was it to communicate with the S2H workers?</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do you feel you can trust the S2H workers?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>What people or events made you decide it was time to start planning to move away from Riverside Drive?</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Were alternatives to Riverside Drive on offer? If yes, were they better or worse and why?</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Are the S2H workers flexible in the way they work? Do they ‘meet you half way’ and try to fit in with your situation?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Do you think you are better off now that you are not at Riverside Drive?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Do you think you’ll be able to make sure you don’t become homeless (or for those in SAAP) don’t end up living outdoors again?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>8a</td>
<td>Was the experience of working with S2H, BCC, Dept of Housing, Centrelink and all those kinds of services to leave Riverside a positive experience for you overall?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>8b</td>
<td>Did it give you a bit more confidence in the system?</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Do you know any more about how some of the services work now than you used to?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Do you have a goal or a plan for your life in mind?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>(For those housed) Do you think you’ll be able to hang on to this tenancy for a year or more?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Do you have any advice for S2H or the Council or the Government about situations like Riverside?</td>
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